

Message Text

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44

ACTION SY-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 FBO-02 A-01 /019 W

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P R 291335Z SEP 75

FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 319

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

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FOR DIKEOS FROM AMBASSADOR

DEPT FOR A/SY/FO, NEA/EX AND FBO

BEIRUT FOR RSS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: ASEC

SUBJ: AMEMBASSY TUNIS SY IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

REF: A) STATE 228167; B) RSO TUNIS OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM DATED
4/17/75; C) TUNIS 3699; D) STATE 119043; E) TUNIS 3151;
F) TUNIS A-87 DATED 7/14/75; G) TUNIS A-164 DATED 11/26/74;
H) RSO TUNIS OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM DATED 8/8/75.

1. POST BELIEVES THERE MAY BE SOME CONFUSION IN DEPT REGARDING
PROPOSED SUCURITY IMPORVEMENTS AT AMEMBASSY TUNIS. THIS IS
AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY SITUATION.

2. CHANCERY LOBBY MODIFICATIONS

A. PER REF (B), THE RSO PROPOSED THAT THE OUTER PORTICO BE
ENCLOSED AND UTILIZED AS A WAITING ROOM FOR NON-OFFICIAL VISITORS.
THIS WOULD PERMIT INDIVIDUALS TO BE IDENTIFIED PRIOR TO THEIR
GAINING ACCESS INTO THE CHANCERY. IT WAS PROPOSED THAT BALLISTICS
RESISTANT MATERIALS BE UTILIZED TO REINFORCE THE GLASSED AREAS.

PER REF (C), THIS PROPOSAL WAS REVIEWED IN TUNIS BY RSS PAUL
GLENN AND HE HEARTILY APPROVED THIS PROPOSAL AS THE ONLY METHOD

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OF PROVIDING SECURITY OF THE CHANCERY IN CASE OF TERRORIST ATTACK.

IN ADDITION TO PROPOSAL AS SUBMITTED BY THE RSO, MR. GLENN RECOMMENDED THAT A SLIDING ELECTRICALLY OPERATED DOOR BE INSTALLED WHICH WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD IN THE INNER LOBBY. ADDITIONALLY, HE RECOMMENDED THE USE OF AN MSG ALONG WITH A LOCAL RECEPTIONIST IN THE OUTER LOBBY TO CONDUCT PACKAGE CONTROLS, WHEREAS THE RSO HAD ONLY PROPOSED TO USE A LOCAL RECEPTIONIST.

B. JUSTIFICATION AND RATIONALE. THE DEPT THEN, PER REF (D), SUGGESTED CONDUCTING SCREENING AT THE ENTRY POINT INTO THE CHANCERY COMPOUND. AS WAS POINTED OUT IN REFS (C), (E), AND (F), THE PERIMETER BARRIERS ARE EASILY SURMOUNTED AND ANY CONTROL APPLIED AT THE ENTRY POINT WOULD BE EASILY CIRCUMVENTED BY TERRORISTS. ONCE PAST THE PERIMETER, ANYONE CAN WALK RIGHT INTO THE CHANCERY LOBBY. FOR THIS REASON SECURITY FOR ALL BUILDINGS WITHIN CHANCERY COMPOUND MUST BEGIN AT THE BUILDING'S ENTRANCE. SUGGESTIONS SET FORTH BY DEPT, PER REF (A), TO INSTALL ELECTRICALLY OPERATED ROLLDOWN STEEL DOOR ARE NOT RPT NOT CONSIDERED FEASIBLE FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: (1) PERIMETER CONTROLS ARE INEFFECTIVE. IN EVENT OF TERRORIST ATTACK TERRORISTS WOULD NOT EXPOSE THEMSELVES OR THEIR INTENTIONS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEY HAD ENTERED CHANCERY LOBBY -- THEN IT WOULD BE TOO LATE. ONCE IN THE LOBBY THE ONLY THING BETWEEN A TERRORIST AND OCCUPYING THE EMBASSY IS ONE MSG; (2) RESTRUCTURING OF THE MSG DESK MIGHT PROVIDE MORE PROTECTION FOR THE MSG BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE CHANCERY. TO PROTECT CHANCERY AGAINST TERRORISTS, ACCESS MUST BE DENIED; (3) ELECTRIC ROLLDOWN DOORS IN THIS CONTEXT ARE TOO SLOW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST ATTACK FROM THE EXTERIOR AND IF TERRORISTS ARE ABLE TO GET INSIDE THE LOBBY, THE CHANCERY IS THEIRS; (4) THE DEPT'S RECOMMENDATION IN REF (A), PARA 3, THAT AN ALARM BE INSTALLED AT THE FRONT GATE WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN OCTOBER 1974, AND SO REPORTED PER REFS (F) AND (G). THEREFORE TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT TERRORISTS COULD ENTER AND CAPTURE THE CHANCERY THE RSO RECOMMENDED THE PORTICO BE ENCLOSED AND UTILIZED AS FOLLOWS: ALL VISITORS TO THE CHANCERY WOULD BE RECEIVED IN THE OUTER LOBBY AND WOULD REMAIN THERE UNTIL SCREENED AND/OR IDENTIFIED BY AN AMERICAN EMPLOYEE. ACCESS INTO THE CHANCERY WOULD BE CONTROLLED BY THE MSG VIA SLIDING BALLISTICS RESISTANT DOORS WHICH WOULD REMAIN CLOSED EXCEPT WHEN CLEARED INDIVIDUALS ARE PERMITTED TO ENTER. THIS PROPOSAL HAS NOW BEEN STUDIED IN DETAIL BY THE RSO AND RSS

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AND IN THEIR PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT THE PROPOSAL IS SOUND AND THE ONLY EFFECTIVE MEANS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE CHANCERY. OPINIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN SOLICITED FROM FBO REPRESENTATIVES SMITH AND BUTTON. BOTH AGREE THAT FROM THE FBO ENGINEERING POINT OF VIEW THIS PROPOSAL IS VALID.

3. REQUEST FOR INCREASE IN MSG DETACHMENT

A. PER REF (H), THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS REQUEST IS BASED UPON A NEED FOR TWO POSTS 24-HRS A DAY WITHIN THE CHANCERY BASED ON THE FORMULA FOR ESTABLISHING THE MSG REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN PSO HANDBOOK 3.5B(4); I.E., TWO POSTS 24 HOURS PER DAY, 7 DAYS PER WEEK EQUALS A TOTAL OF 336 MANHOURS PLUS REQUIRED 1/9 FACTOR FOR A TOTAL OF 373 MANHOURS. ACCORDING TO THIS COMPUTATION NINE MSGS ARE REQUIRED. PRESENT COMPLEMENT IS SIX WATCHSTANDERS.

B. AT PRESENT POST #2 ONLY ACTIVE DURING WORKING HOURS. THIS SITUATION POSES SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS FOR THE POST. AS DEPT IS AWARE, CCTV AND ALARM SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED AT CHANCERY AND ANNEXES. THE SYSTEMS ARE RENDERED INEFFECTIVE FROM 1900 HOURS TO 0500 HOURS (41 PERCENT) SINCE POST #1 ONLY 24-HOUR POST, IS AWAY FROM MSG DESK PERFORMING SHAKEDOWN, CHAR ESCORT, AND DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED WASTE. EMBASSY LACKS MANPOWER RESOURCES TO MONITOR OR RESPOND TO THESE SECURITY SYSTEMS INCLUDING EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS NET.

C. AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE ABOVE, OUR REQUEST FOR INCREASE IN MSG DETACHMENT IS NOT RPT NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO CHANCERY LOBBY. RSO IS COMPLETELY SATISFIED TO LEAVE VISITOR IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING IN THE LOBBY TO A LOCAL EMPLOYEE. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS MSG POST WAS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE RSS. ONLY SOLUTION IS INCREASE IN T.O. MISSION URGENTLY REQUESTS A/SY/FO APPROVE INCREASE FOR MSG DETACHMENT WITH ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL MSGS ASAP.

4. IT IS HOPED THAT THE ABOVE INFORMATION HAS CLARIFIED THESE PROPOSALS AND THAT THE DEPT WILL MOVE QUICKLY TO LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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APPROVE THE MISSION'S REQUESTS.
SEELYE

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